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THE ROLE AND PLACE
OF SECRET COLLABORATORS
IN THE INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITY
OF THE GPU-NKVD
IN THE 1920s AND 1930s
 
(on the basis of materials of the Donbass region)
 
A system of secret informers serves, without exception, as the eyes and ears of any
secret police in any state. Different secret police share many common features. At
the same time, certain traits are distinct and germane to a particular state. They
depend on the particular characteristics of the secret police itself, on the
environment in which it works, on its methods of secret surveillance, on the
surrounding political institutions and on the authorities whose orders are being
carried out. The organs of the Ukrainian GPU-NKVD are no exception to this
general rule. The most characteristic feature of the activity of secret informers was,
first and foremost, devotion to the principles of the Bolshevik Party.
The topic of secret informers is not only a novel one, but also a topic with a
moral and ethical dimension. In keeping with resolution 206, passed by the Cabinet
of Ministers of Ukraine on April 1, 1994, the documents of the GPU-NKVD are
currently preserved in the State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine
(
 
Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrainy – 
 
SBU). In contrast to the former Soviet Baltic
republics, in Ukraine information on “operative-investigative activities” of the state
security organs, as well as on individuals who are collaborating or have
collaborated with these organs in the past, has been legislatively designated as a
state secret. This is the main reason why the topic has not been adequately studied
in Ukrainian historiography. In addition, the study of this data represents certain






source materials. On the other hand, there has been extensive study of this topic by
experts within the state security organs, but these remain classified and designated
exclusively for internal bureaucratic use within the security services themselves.
Nevertheless, after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence, memoirs and
scholarly studies have appeared in Ukraine, which examine the activity of secret





 The memoirs of the jurist L. O. Okynshevych describe the methods used by
the GPU-NKVD for the recruitment of the secret service and the possible




 In examining the formation and
functioning of the administrative-information system, Serhii Bilokin quite
plausibly argued that the great majority of Chekists during the 1920s and 1930s
began their careers as secret informers when they were youths between the ages of





 Nevertheless, on the whole, this problem has not received adequate
attention. This is especially true of the Donbass region. Published memoirs provide
a few rare glimpses of secret informer activity. For instance, V. Halytsky, who
suffered political repression in the Donbass in the late 1930s, recounted the forms
and methods of secret informers in the NKVD prison torture chambers in




 The research proposed here,
however, is the first of its kind. It is based on documents of the All-Ukrainian ChK-
GPU-NKVD, the militia, the procuracy, and the Communist Party that are





From the first days of its existence, the Cheka began to put in place a network of
secret informers, which gradually came to encompass all strata of society without
exception. In the Donbass region, owing to its occupation by the Austro-Germans
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and later the White armies, this work was temporarily interrupted. It was resumed




 with its center in Luhanske, which was later transferred to Bakhmut (now
Artemivske). Archival documents demonstrate that information about the political
and economic situation throughout the entire Donbass territory, including the mood
among the various strata of the population, was gathered and elaborated in great









 center and finally on to the registrational-informational
administration of the central Ukrainian GPU in Kharkiv. Only from there did it land
on the desks of the higher state-political leadership. From the first days of the
creation of these GPU information departments, local party organs actively assisted
in the gathering and transmission of information to the organs of the GPU-NKVD.




 party committee issued a
circular stating that without the “support of party organizations, it will not be
possible to establish the informational work of the GPU on their efforts alone.” The
circular demanded that all local party organizations issue appropriate directives




 party secretaries, with information concerning questions of interest to the
organs of the GPU on the emergence of various counter-revolutionary groups, the
conduct of anti-Soviet individuals, changes in mood among the masses of workers










committee enjoined party members not to interpret such collaboration with the





This necessity of party help to the GPU can be explained by the poor financial
situation of the GPU, particularly after the introduction of the New Economic
Policy. In 1923, central financing was almost entirely cut off and the local GPU
survived exclusively thanks to financing by the local authorities. Until
September 1, 1923, the salary of GPU workers was three to four times lower than




 Food rations and material
help were given out irregularly and below the established norms, and therefore




 It is certain that in such
conditions the small GPU apparatus could not independently conduct informational





. They were most often “up to date on all matters” that were
within the scope of their activity. In addition, they possessed a widespread network
of party informants.
 
5. Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Luhanskoi Oblasti (hereafter DALO), 34/1/2, 20. 
6. DALO, 34/1/1, 134.
7. Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady Ukrainy, 2/2/742, 36.











It should be stressed that such collaboration in the informational sphere among
party organs and organs of the GPU-NKVD is very characteristic of the 1920s and
1930s. Despite the fact that at times informational materials of party informants
were subjective, unconfirmed, and occasionally used for settling personal scores,
they were welcomed by the GPU-NKVD. Thus, on March 25, 1929, the Luhanske
party committee transmitted to the district department of the GPU information from
a party informant named Rudnytsky about the suspected espionage activities of six




 Although in reality these
individuals were merely members of a local group studying economic questions,
they all ended up under GPU-NKVD surveillance and were repressed as a group in
both 1933 and 1938.
The GPU’s use of secret informers was particularly successful in the struggle
against banditism in the Donbass after the Civil War. Such work involved not only
a careful selection of informants and a broad expansion of their informational
network, but also constant education and detailed instructions to each secret




 department of the GPU formulated special
instructions for senior informers in their struggle against banditism, that obliged





 By the end of 1923, 158 secret informers worked in the Transport
Department 
 





. In November 1923 alone, through the senior member of the group
attached to the information apparatus and the district representatives of the Roads
Department of the OGPU, they transmitted sixty valuable analytical reports and
received twenty new assignments. As a result, the locations and personal ties of the
“Ponomarenko,” “Rozorenyi,” “Hushcha,” and other armed gangs who were




 The data obtained was analyzed
and shortly afterwards the gangs were liquidated.









 departments of the GPU determined that in 1924 the majority of




 and the railways of
Ukraine and the adjacent RSFSR was carried out by an armed gang led by
Fomenko. The painstaking work of secret collaborators gathering information
about the bandits enabled the authorities on September 25, 1924, to detain









were 484 secret informers investigating banditism in a joint secret informer
network of the organs of the GPU and the militia. All of them were classified by
separate categories – “A,” “B,” and “C.” Sixty-four of them belonged to the
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considered that banditism had been reduced to levels that could be managed by the
regular militia and so gave up this role. On January 5, 1927, the head of the





For the most part, the organs of the GPU-NKVD in Ukraine duplicated the
structure of the central political police apparatus. Naturally, the structure of the
secret service-informational apparatus of the Ukrainian special services, the forms
and methods of the collection of information also duplicated the all-union ones.










), who took part in the surveillance of individual suspects. These informers





different operative departments, if the acquired information was considered
important and if it was verified as accurate. In order to understand this process, one
must understand the many informational departments of the political police in the
1920s and 1930s, since it was in these departments that informers’ declarations





) and their assistants, agents, and informers
was created in various spheres of the economy, in various organizations and
institutes, as well as in apartment houses. The plenipotentiaries and their assistants
each had a network of agents and informers, from whom they received information
for their reports on local events. Over the years, the size and form of this network
varied greatly depending on the political situation, financing, and the abilities of the
local “Chekists.”









 administrations were likewise created.
Their new secret informer networks were initially very small and far from effective.
There were only 12 new informers in the Manhushiv district department of the
Stalinsk NKVD administration a full six months after its creation. Altogether there
were only 27 active informers in the entire districts and none at all in the two village
soviets of Melekin and Bilosarai. As a result, out of 30 dossiers initiated by the









The secret informer network of the Makiivka city department of the NKVD was
also small. For 32 mines, there were a total of 45 informers specializing in so-called
“anti-sabotage informational work.” The same situation existed in the Horlivka city
department, whose informational network included 27 individuals. Incidentally,
there was no informing at all done at large mines, such as Kocheharka,




 Also, in violation of
 
14. DALO, 1176/2/30, 47.




















instructions issued by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party
and the All-Union NKVD, the Makiivka city department allowed the recruitment of




 organizations, as well as the heads of trade
union mining committees. The city department was also reprimanded because all
seventeen documents that it produced within a six-month period concerning serious
flaws in the work of the coal-mining sector did not include any materials acquired









 NKVD administration, had 124 active secret informers; 59 of
them were engaged in collecting information at enterprises in the coal-mining
sector. Of the 61 active dossiers in January 1939, 43 of them (75%) were being
worked on by secret informers developed as secret service dossiers, while in mid-




 Nevertheless, the state of the
secret informer network was still judged inadequate. An anti-sabotage network had
not been established in the coal-mining industry; informants were recruited
unsystematically and not in accordance with previously worked-out and confirmed
plans. There were not enough residents and even qualified residents and their
assistants governed no more than 14 active informers. Owing to the lack of safe
houses, operative workers met some of their secret informers either in their own
apartments or on the open street, which did not permit them to issue assignments,




 These examples are
not exceptional in the history of the territorial and transport organs of the GPU-
NKVD of the Ukrainian Donbass region. 
An investigation of the Transport Department of the NKVD of the Southern
Donetsk Railway, for example, showed that between January and April 1939 the
secret informer network for political investigations almost broke down completely,
while operative work was organized in a thoroughly primitive fashion. For this
reason, order no. 21 concerning the 
 
Transport Department of the Southern Donetsk
Railway contained assignments that were aimed first and foremost at creating a
clear-cut system of secret informers, including their further instruction and
allocation to the secret informer network as railway station guards, cashiers, hall
porters, porters, waiters, baggage check attendants, attendants at newspaper kiosks,
postal, and baggage departments, hairdressing salons, conductors of suburban
trains, and controllers. They were obliged to gather and transmit information not
only about passengers and transport workers but also about the residents of



















21. Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Upravlinnia Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrainy v Donetskii Oblasti (hereafter
DA USBU DO). A collection of documents of the Transport Division of the NKVD of the
Southern Donetsk Railway. File no. 494, case 15, fols. 19-20.
 




The study of the organization and use of the GPU’s secret informer network
during collectivization is of particular interest. In order to acquire indispensable
information, the GPU created an extensive network of secret informers. In one
single case, pertaining to the surveillance of the “Sybiriak” group from 1929 to




 department, and later
also the Luhanske city department of the GPU, actively monitored almost
200 peasants of the Luhanske, Novosvitlivka, and Uspenske districts. Who were
these secret informers? What were their place and role in the surveillance carried
out by local GPU organs? How valuable and objective was the information that
they were acquiring?
Documents show that for the most part these were native-born, relatively young
farmers; 80% of them were between 28 and 30 years of age; 17% were under 30 to
45 years old, and 3% were over 45. None of them belonged to the Communist
Party. Like the majority of the rural population at the time, they had little education,
although they carried some authority in the peasant milieu and among former Red
partisans, because they were good agriculturalists. In the past they had taken part in
various armed formations against the Austro-German and Denikin occupations of
Ukraine. They collaborated with the organs of the GPU for several years. Since
they were to acquire information within the national Ukrainian milieu, they were
Ukrainians by nationality and almost all of them were local residents. Seven
percent of them also worked as informers within the cells of the local GPU prison,
reporting on what detained or arrested individuals were saying. These informers, in
contrast to the others, had a higher or comparatively higher education, sometimes
they were a member of the clergy, or in the past had supported the Bolsheviks and
even served in the armies of the All-Union Cheka and had settled in the Donbass




Some of them had rather colorful biographies. Thus, A. D. Chaika, who was
born in the Uspenske district, worked as a hired laborer until he was 18 years old. In
the years of the first Russian democratic revolution he leaned toward the Bolshevik
faction of the Social Democratic Party. In 1905, he took an active part in the armed
demonstration of Donbass workers in the city of Horlivka. Concealing his
participation in the armed revolt against the tsarist government, he was conscripted
into the army where he served as secretary of a military unit in the city of Bakhmut.
He was arrested in 1907 for taking part in a May Day meeting. Released shortly
thereafter, he secretly provided fellow soldiers who were evading arrest with
documents from the army administration. When he was discovered, he deserted.
With the help of falsified documents, he hid in Germany, Austria, and Poland,
where he was arrested several times. After being deported from Russia, he was
arrested in 1910, deprived of his rights, and imprisoned in St. Nicholas’s Fortress in
St. Petersburg. Upon his return to Ukraine, he was arrested for distributing leaflets
appealing to workers of the Donbass to protest against the arbitrariness of the
 
22. Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Upravlinnia Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrainy v Luhanskii Oblasti (hereafter






Austro-German occupiers and the regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. Evading
arrest, he joined a partisan squadron. After the defeat of Denikin’s armies and the




, he served in the Luhanske party committee and later
in a special-task county battalion attached to the local Cheka. After demobilization,





beginning of collectivization, Chaika, who was convinced that the Soviet
leadership was conducting an erroneous policy in the villages, personally
transmitted his proposals and view of the situation to the head of the Central
Executive Committee of the USSR, I. M. Kalinin, the head of the All-Ukrainian
Executive Committee, H. I Petrovsky, and the organs of the all-union and
republican procurator’s offices. Many times he challenged the arbitrariness of the




 He was an unusual person and
undoubtedly had undeniable authority and many connections in a number of
districts in the Donbass. He was very well informed and was justifiably considered
one of the most valuable secret informers of the GPU’s Donetsk operative sector
number 2.
In general, the GPU secret informers involved in the monitoring 
 
of the
“Sybiriak” group were well-informed and their information about the local
situation was objective and, for the most part, realistic. The secret informers
displayed initiative in acquiring information. For example, D. I. Savchenko and
P. M. Kolisnychenko transmitted exhaustive information about the political moods
of various strata of the population, the milieu of former Red partisans and
participants in the Civil War, officials of the district administration, and the most
active low-level members in the villages. They purportedly prevented several




 On the other hand, the means by which they
obtained information often involved provocations and bordered on legal violations.
Often their information was presented in a subservient and dogmatic form, marked
by ideological clichés, as the local GPU required.
Thus, Savchenko, endeavoring to acquire information about the existence of
anti-Soviet manifestations among former Red partisans in Luhanske district, held
meetings in his own building. During these encounters he offered strong alcoholic
beverages to those present, encouraging the tipsy and drunken citizens to launch
into political discussions of forbidden topics. Meanwhile, the representatives of
local power, who had hidden themselves in the building ahead of time, were
listening and noting down everything that was taking place. As a rule, the local
militia would disband the meeting and information acquired in this manner would




The information provided to the GPU about a rebel kulak group armed with sawed-
off shotguns, Nagan revolvers, and Brownings in the village of Novo-Annivtsi also
 










, vol. 1, fols. 135-136.
 








 As investigative materials eventually showed, the 120
“rebels” in three rural districts and in the industrial city of Luhanske were “armed”




The secret informer, A. D. Chaika, also acted in a provocational manner. While
mingling with arrested and detained villagers in the cells of the Novosvitlivka
militia and the Luhanske city department of the GPU, Chaika disseminated
newspaper materials about the trial of members of the Union for the Liberation of
Ukraine (SVU) then taking place in Kharkiv. Calling the leaders of this
organization the defenders and liberators of the peasantry, he proposed that his
cellmates join a local SVU branch that he headed. At the same time he explained
that many members of the SVU were still at liberty and continuing their national-
patriotic activity. Chaika called for open opposition to the current Soviet regime





Completing the surveillance action, the local Chekists proclaimed that some of
the secret informers had been leaders of an anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary
organization that was preparing to topple Soviet rule and restore a capitalist system
of agricultural management. In order to lend verisimilitude to these falsifications,
they also revealed a connection between the rebels’ committee and an organization
of specialist saboteurs uncovered earlier. These were agronomists and land




 land division, as well as a rebel kulak
organization that allegedly existed in the north, whose members were kulaks that




 Confirming these fabrications
during interrogations, the secret informers D. I. Savchenko, P. M. Kolisnychenko,
A. D. Chaika, and others, after “repenting” of their supposed acts, named everyone









 In the absence of evidence against them, 62.7% of them were





As might be expected, the secret informers A. D. Chaika, P. M. Kolisnychenko,





 The only one to suffer was D. I. Savchenko, who was not




















































 With this the
leadership of the local GPU did not complete the monitoring of the “Sybiriak”
group but transformed it into another dossier, in connection with which some of





 Later, many of the secret informers, including





The number of secret informers in the Donbass in the latter half of the 1930s
began to be taken to an absurd degree. They were present in practically all civic
organizations, institutions, and branches of industry, transport, and agriculture.
They were far more numerous than those engaged in political investigations in the
entire Russian empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the secret
informer network also encompassed practically all civic organizations and political




As one characteristic instance, out of 20 staff members of High School no. 3 in
the city of Voroshylovhrad, 13 (that is, 65%) were secret informers of the local
NKVD department: “Luhansky,” “Kolidchenko,” “Chervonyi” (Red), “Oko”
(Eye), “Stepanovsky,” “Sotyi” (One Hundredth), and so forth. Over a period of
years they investigated one of their colleagues, H. A. Borshch, who was the finest
mathematics teacher in the city. Periodically, the city NKVD department also
brought the secret informers “Bohaienko,” “Melnykov,” “Fedchenko,” and others
into this investigation. These individuals were his fellow classmates from the
university that they had attended, directors and administrators of the teaching staff
sections of a number of other municipal schools, leading workers of the local
department of national education, and so forth. Their total number even surpassed




Each day they noted down every step, glance, and word that was uttered by
Borshch: his conversations at home, on public transport, among his colleagues at
work, with his children working on their school assignments. They uncovered
spelling mistakes in the protocols of trade union meetings of the school teaching
staff, which he had written and signed. There were even attempts to “read” his mind
when he was alone. Particular industriousness was demonstrated by the secret
informer of the local NKVD department named “Oko,” the only woman in the
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department selected and classified only that information which would incriminate
the subject under article 54 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. During the
interrogations of H. A. Borshch, who was arrested in 1937, illiterate NKVD
investigators cynically lectured him, declaring that as a specialist with three higher





 In the end the subject was sentenced by a panel of three




 on the basis of “anti-Soviet
counter-revolutionary Ukrainian nationalist agitation” and disappeared in the
concentration camps of the Gulag system.41
The higher educational establishments of the Donbass were particularly well
penetrated by secret informers of the GPU-NKVD. In his memoirs, the well-known
Ukrainian scholar H. O. Kostiuk describes an incident that took place at the
Donetsk Institute of Education. The director of the institute told Kostiuk that the
general situation in this educational establishment was favorable to creative work
and that no one was spying on him. If he were to come under surveillance, he, the
director, would warn him of such a danger. With no warning, Kostiuk was abruptly
dismissed from his job for nationalistic manifestations and distorting the teaching
program.42 Kostiuk did not suspect that “Virnyi,” a secret collaborator of the
Luhanske city NKVD department, and the director, were one and the same person.
During one year alone at his post, 41 students and seven “professors-class
enemies,” not including Kostiuk, were expelled from the institute on direct orders
from the NKVD.43
True, this same “Virnyi,” who was relying on his former collaboration with the
organs of the All-Union Cheka in the Civil War years and after the war with the
central apparatus of the Ukrainian GPU-NKVD, tried to exert his influence
somehow on the general situation in his higher educational establishment and to
protect some of the students and lecturers from the lawlessness of the local
Chekists. He, too, suffered as a result of this: he was dismissed from his post,
expelled from the ranks of the party, and repressed.44 However, for his active
collaboration with the GPU-NKVD he was soon released from the Sevvostlag
(Northeastern Camp) of the NKVD and reinstated at his former place of work
where, during the next ten years, he headed the Faculty of Marxism-Leninism. He
remained a secret informer of the NKVD and MGB until he was transferred to a
higher educational establishment in the Transcarpathian region. 
The fate of other secret informers in this university was not as fortunate as
“Virnyi’s.” A secret informer of the same Luhanske city NKVD department named
“Lavriv” accidentally revealed his identity to “Virnyi.”45 For this, on December 7,
40. Ibid., fol. 22.
41. Ibid., fols. 98-100.
42. H. O. Kostiuk, Zustrichi i proshchannia. Spohady (Edmonton, 1987), Book 1: 461.
43. DA USBU LO, case 5258, vol. 1, fols. 69, 90 verso, 118-125, 393.
44. Ibid., fol. 4 verso.
45. DA USBU LO, case 682 r., fols. 114, 116, 138; case 5258, vol. 1, fols. 124, 126.
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1937, a panel of three NKVD judges of the former Donetsk oblast´ sentenced him
to 10 year’s imprisonment in a corrective hard-labor camp. After completing his
full term in Irkutsk oblast´, on January 11, 1950, he was re-sentenced to 10 years’
imprisonment, which he served in Magadan.46
Even harsher punishments were meted out to those who, under the conditions of
a totalitarian society, had the courage not only to warn subjects figuring in
investigations that they were being spied on by the NKVD, but also offered advice
on how to save themselves from the persecution. Thus, in the indictments of crimes
committed under articles 54-10 and 54-11 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian
SSR, Ia. Ie. Oleksiiv, the head of the teaching department of Luhanske Pedagogical
Institute, admitted that as a secret informer of the NKVD “he committed a
treacherous act, having warned the subject under investigation that he had a
directive to spy on him.”47 On April 19, 1938, by a decision of a trio of judges of the
NKVD administration of the former Donetsk oblast´, he was sentenced to death and
executed by firing squad.48
Documents indicate that in the 1930s secret double agents were not only
dismissed from the secret agent-informer network of the GPU-NKVD, but were
also the cause of the destruction of a large number of innocent people. Thus, a
secret informer of the territorial organs of the All-Union Cheka-GPU-NKVD in the
Dnipropetrovsk region, Zaporizzhia, and the Donbass, known as “Populiarnyi”
(Popular), enjoyed great authority among the participants of the Makhno
movement in his capacity as the former head of the Revolutionary Council attached
to Nestor Makhno and as one of the publishers of the newspaper Nabat (The
Tocsin). Despite his active collaboration with the organs of the All-Union Cheka-
GPU-NKVD, he retained a high opinion of the organizational talents of Makhno as
the distinguished leader of a popular movement.49 Although the information that he
transmitted to the organs of the All-Union Cheka-GPU-NKVD was of great value,
owing to his opinions, he was considered a double agent. For this reason, several
times he was deprived of his voter’s rights, dismissed from his post with or without
cause, arrested, and dismissed from the secret informer network. Finally, he was
arrested by the 4th Directorate of the Ukrainian NKVD for the former Donetsk
oblast´ and executed. Using his name and connections, the NKVD fabricated a
case in 1938 about the existence of a large Makhnoist insurgent underground in
Ukraine. On April 1, 1938, 13 “rebel squadrons” were uncovered. Sixty-two men
were arrested, including 23 who were former members of the command staff of
Makhno’s military units.50 Naturally, they experienced the same fate as
“Populiarnyi.” 
46. DA USBU LO, case 682 r., fols. 164, 179, 188.
47. DA USBU LO, case 6934r, fols. 16-17.
48. Ibid., fol. 19.
49. DA USBU LO, case 2119 f. p., fol. 213.
50. Ibid., fol. 249
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A comparative analysis of GPU-NKVD documents in the 1920s and 1930s
attests to the fact that the punishment meted out to secret informers of the GPU-
NKVD for disclosing their identity in the 1920s was milder, and cases did not
always reach court. For example, on September 19, 1926, the NKVD department of
Luhanske okrug restricted itself only to initiating a case against S. Romanov under
article 117 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR for disclosing his identity as
a seksot (sekretnyi sotrudnik – secret collaborator).51
Those secret informers who served the existing regime in good faith established
their careers very quickly. They obtained promotions and were encouraged both
materially and morally. Thus, for more than 30 years a secret informer named
“Kvitko” was active as a secret informer of the organs of the GPU-NKVD-MGB-
KGB in the Kyiv region, Zaporizzhia, and the Donbass. He was born in the Kyiv
region and from the age of 20 took an active part in the Ukrainian national
liberation movement in the Pereiaslav region. While studying at the Kyiv Institute
of Economics, he was first arrested by the GPU organs in 1925 and received a
suspended sentence of up to five years. After completing his law studies at the
Institute, he worked as a correspondent for the newspapers Bilshovyk (Bolshevik),
Visti (News), and Student revoliutsii (Student of the Revolution). In his articles and
creative sketches he exposed “Ukrainian nationalism.” From 1927 to 1929 he
worked as an investigator. After obtaining a teaching degree, he switched over
entirely to pedagogical work in 1929. In 1927 alone, he provided the GPU with
valuable information about 27 individuals. Despite the fact that almost all of his and
his wife’s close and distant relatives had been repressed by the NKVD, on the basis
of materials provided by him the Voroshylovhrad oblast´ department of the NKVD
administration monitored and engineered the “Nizhyntsi” case (1936), the
“Plisniava” case (1937-1939), the “Pokydky” case (1940-1941), and cases against
individual representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the Donbass, Kharkiv,
Kyiv, and Zaporizzhia regions. Left in place by the organs of the NKVD on the
territory of Ukraine occupied by the Nazi Germans, he exposed the underground
operations of the OUN (b) (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – Bandera
faction) in Voroshylovhrad, Kyiv, and Kamianets-Podilsky oblasti – the so-called
“Prosvitiany” and “Heolohy” groups. As a reward for his services to the GPU-
NKVD, he was allowed to occupy the combined positions of head and dean of the
Faculty of Literature at one of the largest pedagogical establishments of higher
education in Ukraine. Transferred to Western Ukraine, he occupied leading
positions there and remained an active secret informer for the organs of the MGB-
KGB.52
There were other incentives for secret informers. As attested by order no. 32 of
the Transport Department of the Main Administration of State Security (GUGB) of
the Southern Donetsk Railway of December 19, 1937, “Concerning the rewarding
51. DALO, 636/1/53, 58.
52. DA USBU LO, Kolektsiia dokumentiv UMGB Voroshylovhradskoi oblasti 1943-1945 rr.,
fol. 1949.
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of collaborators of the Transport Department of the GUGB and the United
Transport Department of the GUGB of the Southern Donetsk Railway for active
work against counter-revolution,” in addition to 41 of the finest Chekists, the secret
informers of the NKVD “Lehkyi” (Light), “Semenov,” and “Skromnyi” (Modest)
received rewards. Besides expressions of gratitude, each of them received a
payment of 200-300 rubles.53
Frequently, the incentives awarded to secret informers were criminal in nature.
This happened in cases when, at the request or under pressure from the organs of
the GPU-NKVD, the courts and the procurator’s office were compelled to suspend
criminal cases against secret collaborators, who then evaded punishment
completely. For example, on August 9, 1926, the GPU department of Luhanske
okrug requested the head of the okrug court and the okrug procurator to take under
personal consideration during the court’s examination of the criminal case the fact
that the accused, I. P. Kashuba, “has been a secret informer of the GPU since
January 30, 1925, and is a very valuable worker.” Judging by the resolution
contained in the letter, this request was satisfied. 
This was fairly typical during the 1930s. At the same time, it should be kept in
mind that relations between the GPU-NKVD, procuratorial supervision, and the
courts were governed by special resolutions of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive
Committee (VUTsVK) and later the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. These
resolutions were frequently supplemented by sub-legal acts and secret instructions.
For example, the October 10, 1928, resolution of the VUTsVK about the relations
between law-enforcement organs was supplemented by a joint special secret
instruction of the VUTsVK and the Council of Peoples’ Commissars permitting
secret informers of the GPU to be subpoenaed as witnesses only by agreement of
the political police.54 In fabricating numerous cases against various counter-
revolutionary organizations, the GPU organs utilized this instruction in their own
interests. They launched court cases or examinations by extra-judicial organs
against their own secret informers. In this way, they would rid their secret informer
network of passive secret informers who showed little initiative, while encouraging
the rest actively to seek out and provide indispensable information and to attribute
significance to elaborated and fabricated cases. The materials pertaining to the
secret informer investigation of the “Sybiriak” affair that we have examined here
confirm this observation.
(Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk
with the financial support of the Havard Ukrainian Research Institute)
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